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14 Kant's theory of peace
In the two centuries since its original formulation, Kant's theory of
peace has lost none of its relevance. In fact, because of the recent
resurgence of debates about globalization, about the role and man-
date of the United Nations, and about the international order after
the end of the Cold War, Kant's theory of peace has been steadily
gaining attention since 1989.
Kant argues in Perpetual Peace and in the Metaphysics of Morals
that true peace is possible only when states are organized internally
according to "republican" principles, when they are organized exter-
nally into a voluntary league that promotes peace, and when they
respect the human rights not only of their own citizens but also
of foreigners. He regards these three main requirements as intrinsi-
cally connected and argues that they can be successfully met only
jointly.
From the moment Perpetual Peace was published, Kant's ideal
of a league of states was hotly disputed (when it was not rejected
out of hand as wildly unrealistic|. The formation of the League of
Nations and later of the United Nations has not put an end to the
debates. Points of contention persist as to whether the formation of
a league of the kind envisioned by Kant is a good idea, and if so, what
shape it should have; moreover, there is fundamental disagreement
even on what exactly Kant's views are. Does he regard the league
as the only form of international cooperation that is feasible and
desirable, or does he actually see it as a step on the way toward
a further goal, namely, that of an international federation of states
with the authority to coercively enforce a common federal law?
More recently, there has been an upsurge in the attention paid to
the other two requirements. Kant's claim that republics are more
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peaceful than other kinds of states (nowadays usually discussed as
the "democratic peace" thesis]' underwent renewed scrutiny when
it was pointed out, in the 19808, that the empirical record of the pre-
vious two centuries shows that democracies did indeed not wage war
against each other during that time. Kant's theory of cosmopolitan
right is enjoying growing interest because it addresses the rightful
status of individuals vis-à-vis states of which they are not citizens.
This is an issue that is increasingly relevant in a world full of indi-
viduals - from business travelers to refugees - who move (or attempt
to move! across borders.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXTS
Kant was by no means the first to develop a proposal for interna-
tional peace.2 He himself mentions the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and
Jean-Jacques Rousseau as his predecessors.' Saint-Pierre had pro-
posed that the Christian rulers of Europe form a federation with a per-
manent senate and an international court of arbitration, backed up
by an international military force, to settle disputes between mem-
ber states. Other key requirements mentioned by Saint-Pierre are the
reduction of standing armies and the prohibition of territorial expan-
sion and intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Rousseau
had summarized the contents of Saint-Pierre's work and presented
them to a broader audience.4
The first published essay in which Kant himself articulates the
normative ideal of international peace and its requirements is the
"Ideas toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of
View" (1784). The ideal of an international federation of states
that Kant formulates here returns many times in later writings, for
instance, in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Theory and
Practice (1793), Conflict of the Faculties (1798), and most notably
Perpetual Peace (1795) and the Metaphysics of Morals (1797!.
Kant's views on peace undergo important modifications over time
and move further away from Saint-Pierre's proposals in the process.
During the 17805 Kant advocated the establishment of a strong fed-
eration of states with coercive authority at the federal level, and like
Saint-Pierre, he appealed to the enlightened self-interest of rulers to
defend the feasibility of this ideal. During the 17905, however, Kant
began to defend the establishment of a league without coercive pow-
ers (although he continued to mention the stronger form of federation
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as the ideal dictated by reason). Furthermore, he added the novel cat-
egory of "cosmopolitan right" as the third kind of public right. To
make the feasibility of his proposal plausible, Kant relied no longer
merely on the self-interest of rulers. As he developed his republican-
ism, he mentioned a much broader set of natural forces that force
humankind in the direction of peace, including the peaceful nature
of republican states.
The changes in Kant's theory of peace are not unrelated to the
historical developments at the time. Of the many events that could
be mentioned here, the political events in France are probably the
most important. During the French Revolution, the Ancien Régime
was overthrown - or, according to Kant's preferred interpretation:
Louis XVI handed sovereignty over to the people when he turned to
them for financial help [Morals, 6:34^-2). Subsequently, France was
transformed into a republic, and from then on the republican ideal
takes on a more and more central role in Kant's political thought.
In the early 17905, the new French republic employed an official
rhetoric of wanting to "liberate" other peoples from their tyrants
and form a fraternal alliance with the resulting states. Reality proved
considerably more complicated, however. France was remarkably
successful in its war against the large royalist alliance of European
monarchies that aimed at reinstating the French monarchy. Yet it
turned out that the people in most other countries did not regard the
French invasion as their liberation. In t795 France concluded peace
with Prussia and Spain, but the end of the decade saw the rise of
Napoleon and an increasingly successful French expansionism.
Kant seems to have always expected that the French republic
would help the cause of international peace. This is implicit in his
thesis, in Perpetual Peace, that republics are naturally more peace-
ful than despotic states. Moreover, he defends the feasibility of his
own theory of peace by claiming that the French republic could
become the center of a peace-promoting union that other states
would then join (8:356). Toward the end of the decade he report-
edly expressed the hope that Napoleon would bring about perpetual
peace.'
Another historical process that is of importance for understanding
Kant's views on peace is the spread of Europeans around the world.
The European powers had of course been expanding their reach over
the rest of the world for quite some time already, with different
emphasis in different cases: from the establishment of trading posts
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to the control over natural resources elsewhere, the establishment
of colonies, the slave trade, the exploitation of slaves on plantations,
or the famous voyages of "discovery." Kant knew about all of this
and followed reports about other continents with enormous interest.
Although his attitudes towards non-Europeans are characterized, at
least through the 17808, by a good deal of ignorance, inconsistency,
and harmful prejudice,6 Kant was - unlike many others of his time -
concerned with establishing peace not merely in Europe, but across
the entire globe.
n. KANT'S THEORY OF PERPETUAL PEACE
In Kant's theory of international peace, all three parts of public right
come into play. The rightful regulation of the interactions among
individuals requires the rule of law within a rightful state; the right-
ful regulation of the interactions among states requires the rule
of international right; and the rightful regulation of the interac-
tions between states (or their representatives) and foreign individ-
uals requires the rule of cosmopolitan right. Kant's theory of right is
inherently cosmopolitan and includes not just a theory of the state,
but also a theory of international right and cosmopolitan right.
All three parts of public right are grounded in the basic idea of
external freedom. Kant argues that the notion of "right" derives from
the concept of freedom as applied to the external relations among per-
sons. Right is the "restriction of the freedom of each to the condition
of its being compatible with the freedom of everyone, to the extent
this freedom is possible in accordance with a general law; and public
right is the sum of external laws that make such a universal harmony
possible" (Theory and Practice, 8:289-90,- see also Morals, 6:230.!
Public right requires, first of all, a state with just laws and the
power to enforce them. In the absence of a just legal system with
coercive authority, that is, in the state of nature, no one's right to
external freedom can be secure against violence by others [Morals,
6:312). Kant is not here making the empirical assumption that peo-
ple are in fact prone to violate the freedom of others (although he
certainly believes they are); rather, he is assuming the a priori idea
that people are free and that freedom implies the possible violation
of the freedom of others. This posssibility alone is enough to require
a system of laws and their enforcement to protect rightful freedom.
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The only political system that is fully compatible with the require-
ments of public right is a republic. By "republic" Kant means a
political system that is based on the principles of the freedom and
equality of the citizens, and, depending on which text one reads,
their independence as co-legislators (Theory and Practice, 8:294) or
their dependence on a common legislation {Perpetual Peace, 8:349).
A republic is governed by the rule of law, not the caprice of a despot.
The laws of a republic are enacted by the citizens through their
representatives. In a republic, the legislative, executive, and judi-
cial branches of government are properly separated from each other.
Finally, neither the territory of a republic nor the offices associ-
ated with its government are the personal property of the officers in
function.
The ideal of the individual's freedom being "compatible with the
freedom of everyone" transcends the level of the state, however. It
also calls for the regulation of the behavior of states among each
other and of individuals and states toward foreign individuals. This
is because protecting external freedom at the state level alone is not
enough to protect it completely. The latter also requires that states
subject themselves to the rightful regulation of their interactions
with each other. As long as states (republics or not) remain in the
state of nature, in their interactions with other states, there is the
threat of war, and war is a fundamental threat to the freedom of
individuals - after all, the question of who wins a war is decided by
might, not right.
Thus, it is not surprising that Kant often discusses the rightful
regulation at the state level and at the inter-state level in tandem
and that he regards the two as equally necessary. Beginning with
the "Ideas toward a Universal History," he regards the solution of
the one problem as dependent on the solution of the other. In this
essay, he claims that the achievement of a perfect state constitution
is not possible until rightful external relations among states (in an
international federation) have been achieved (8:24). In later essays he
turns the order around and claims that international peace will not
be achieved until after states have become republics (e.g., Theory and
Practice, 8:311). In Perpetual Peace, he argues that the two require-
ments stand in a reciprocal relationship (along with cosmopolitan
right, about which more below) and that the one cannot be fully
achieved without the other (8:349, note).
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The thesis that states should leave the state of nature raises the
question, however, of what peace at the global level requires. Kant's
view on this matter evolves over time. Initially, in the "Ideas toward
a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784), he
argues that the situation of states in the state of nature is entirely
analogous to that of individuals in the state of nature, and that just
as individuals ought to leave the state of nature by subjecting them-
selves to common laws and law enforcement, states ought to form
a global federation with coercive powers at the federal level. In this
essay, Kant advocates a "cosmopolitan situation," which will come
about once states form a federation "similar to a civil common-
wealth" (8:25). They should "abandon the lawless state of savagery
and enter into a federation of peoples in which every state, even the
smallest, could expect its security and its rights, not from its own
power or its own legal judgment, but rather solely from this great
federation of peoples..., from a united power and from decisions
based on laws of a united will" (8:24).7
Later, most clearly in Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant defends a more complex view. In Perpetual Peace,
Kant introduces a new and detailed set of conditions for attaining
peace among states. First of all, he mentions a series of six nega-
tive conditions, in the form of "preliminary articles": Peace treaties
should not contain secret reservations (as the 1795 Basel peace treaty
between France and Prussia had contained); states should not be able
to acquire other states (through inheritance, barter, purchase, or gift);
standing armies should be phased out; states should not assume debts
for the sake of foreign policy; states should not intervene with vio-
lence in the internal affairs (the constitution and government) of
other states; and practices that undermine the possibility of mutual
trust among states should be banned (such as employing assassins
and recruiting traitors) (8:343-7).
Furthermore, Kant mentions three positive conditions, or "defini-
tive articles": that states be internally organized in accordance with
the principle of republicanism; that they pursue and honor the estab-
lishment of a league of states externally; and that states and individu-
als respect the principle of hospitality in their dealings with foreign-
ers. Kant claims that all three are necessary conditions for peace.
I will comment on each of these three in order.
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Republicanism is important not only because it is the only con-
stitution that is fully in accordance with external right, but also
because it is the only constitution that by its nature leads to peace.
Despots can easily burden their subjects with the costs of warfare
without incurring direct costs to themselves. In republics, by con-
trast, the citizens' consent is required for the decision to go to war,
and citizens themselves shoulder the burdens of warfare (financial
and otherwise). Therefore, Kant claims, citizens are naturally dis-
inclined to vote for a war and a republic is naturally inclined to be
peaceful (8:352].
Kant's position on the regulation of the interactions among states
is considerably less clear. Is his ultimate ideal a league of states? Or
is this merely apparent and does he actually advocate the establish-
ment of a federative union of states, as a few commentators have
claimed? Or does he regard a league as the necessary first step on
the road toward a federation of states? The standard view is the first.
A small minority of commentators defends the second position, on
the basis of the logic of Kant's overall position.8 I believe there are
good reasons (both textual and philosophical) to believe that the third
alternative better represents Kant's view, that is, that Kant advo-
cates the establishment of a noncoercive league of states |at least in
his mature political writings such as Perpetual Peace and the Meta-
physics of Morals], but that he does so because he regards it as the
only possible road to the ultimate ideal, a state of states.
In the second "Definitive Article" of Perpetual Peace, Kant claims
that international right should be based on the "federalism of free
states" (8:354!. Read in isolation, the statement may seem ambigu-
ous. It may seem unclear whether the term "federalism" refers to
a federation with coercive powers over the member states (analo-
gous to a state) or to a looser confederation of independent states.
Kant uses the word "Bund" to refer to both. Similarly, the term "free
states" could refer to states that are not under binding international
laws, or to states that enjoy the kind of rightful freedom analogous to
the freedom enjoyed by citizens in a republic. When Kant's accompa-
nying comments are taken into account, however, it becomes clear
that he here advocates the establishment of a voluntary league of
states, a league without any highest legislative or coercive authority
(8:356; also Morals 6:351).
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In both Perpétua! Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, however,
Kant claims also that reason demands the formation of a state of
states. In a notorious passage in Perpetual Peace he writes:
As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no
other way for them to emerge from the lawless condition, which contains
only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings,
their wild (lawless] freedom, and to accustom themselves to public, binding
laws, and to thereby form a (continually expanding) state of peoples (civitas
gentium), which would ultimately comprise all of the peoples on earth. But
they do not want this at all, according to their conception of the right of
peoples (thus rejecting in hypothesi what is right in thesi];9 therefore, instead
of the positive idea of a world republic |if not everything is to be lost) only
the negative surrogate of a lasting and continually expanding league \Bund\
that averts war can halt the stream of law-shunning and hostile inclination,
but with a constant threat of its breaking out. (8:357)
This passage has caused considerable consternation among readers,
as it seems to be an entirely uncharacteristic concession to realism
on Kant's part. It is usually read as reducing what is normatively
required (a state of states) to something more feasible (a league] on
the basis of what states can be expected to want to join. This is then
judged to be an inconsistent move because of Kant's own vehement
and explicit opposition to theories that reduce what is normatively
required on the basis of empirical data of the past or speculation of
what is practically realistic (see especially his arguments in Theory
and Practice}.10 Thus, on the standard reading, Kant contradicts him-
self fundamentally and blatantly, within one and the same section,
and with regard to one of the most important issues of the book.
Many commentators have argued that to be consistent, Kant should
have advocated (or better: should have advocated only] the establish-
ment of a federation of states (with coercive authority at the federal
level over the member states), and not a league, as the proper way to
overcome the state of nature. They argue that the logic of the argu-
ment is the same, whether it is states or individuals who leave the
state of nature, and hence that the result should be the same in both
cases: a state in the case of individuals, a state of states in the case
of states. ':
It is not necessary to read the quoted passage in this way, how-
ever, and there is an alternative reading that makes more sense both
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textually and philosophically. Note first of all that the quote is not
a call to reject the ideal of a world republic. Furthermore, Kant does
not say that states will never want to join a federation but, rather,
that they do not want to do so because they (mis)interpret interna-
tional right as a right to remain in the state of nature. As we shall
see, it is possible to read the quoted passage as saying that the only
way to leave the state of nature among states is by starting with a
league of states, while the federation remains the ultimate ideal.
What is necessary to make this reading plausible is an account
of how the states' not wanting to join a federation can be a valid
reason, according to Kant, for advocating a league. It is possible to
construct such an account, on the basis of an analysis of why the
analogy posited between the state of nature among individuals and
that among states is not in fact a perfect analogy. The considerable
difference is the following. When individuals leave the state of nature
to submit to the laws of a common state, the state they form may
not be perfect, but it will be better, normatively speaking, than the
state of nature that they left behind because before its creation there
was no rule of law at all. This is not true, however, in the case of
states leaving the state of nature.
In Perpetual Peace Kant explicates the difference, cryptically, by
stating that "states already have an internal legal constitution, and
thus they have outgrown the coercion of others to subject them to
a broader legal constitution according to their [viz., others'] concep-
tions of right" (8:355-6). In the Vorarbeiten (drafts and notes) for Per-
petual Peace, he writes that states are allowed to resist the attempt
by others to force them to join a federative state of states "because
within them public right has already been established, whereas in the
case of individuals in the state of nature nothing of the kind takes
place" (23:168). Why would having an internal legal constitution
be a reason not to have to be forced into a state of states? The best
explanation is that forcing an unwilling state into a federation would
violate the autonomy of the individuals composing the state, collec-
tively as co-legislating citizens. Kant defines the state as a union
of individuals under laws of right, and ideally as a union of politi-
cally autonomous individuals (see Morals, 6:313). Forcing them into
a state of states against their will would run counter to the basic idea
of political autonomy. Forcing individuals into a state, by contrast,
does not violate their political autonomy because, on the Kantian
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account, they do not have political autonomy as long as they remain
in the state of nature.
The problem with coercing unwilling states into a federation is
not just that a despotic state of states could destroy the rights and
freedoms that the citizens of a just republic had already secured inter-
nally (although this certainly is a problem too). The point is a deeper
one. Even the individuals within currently despotic states may not
want to join a federation of states if this has to happen on a concep-
tion of right that differs from their own.
One way to make this point clear is to think through what it
would mean if we were to take the level of individuals and that of
states in the state of nature as perfectly analogous. Most authors
who claim that Kant should have argued in favor of the immediate
establishment of a federative state of states do not themselves take
this argument to its logical consequences; they inconsistently allow
for voluntary joining and seceding. A few are more consistent, and
then the results are propositions like the following:
[I]f... the creation of a world government would require that all nations have
democratic or "republican" forms of government, then the prospects for the
creation of a world government are not good. It may seem unlikely that all
nations would ever agree to a particular form of a world government. But this
is not necessary for the creation of a world government. It would be enough
if all great powers (or all nuclear powers] agreed to the idea of a world state.
They could then unite and compel other nations to join.11
Here the state of states is based on the sheer power of a few states
with the weaponry that can compel all others, regardless of the oth-
ers' "conception of right," to use Kant's words quoted above.'3 The
despotic structure of this situation should be clear.
One might still wonder whether Kant should not make an excep-
tion for cases in which a state of states that is organized in accor-
dance with principles of right coerces an oppressive despotic state
into its organization, reorganizing the internal political structure of
that state in the process and thereby improving the external freedom
of the individuals within it. After all, it might seem that the freedom
and political autonomy of these individuals would be only served in
the process, as they would now receive rights and freedoms that they
did not enjoy before. What is overlooked in this objection, however,
is that this is an essentially paternalistic line of reasoning that passes
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over the political autonomy of the people it purports to serve. The
people may well want to get rid of their despot, but it does not fol-
low that they will want to join a particular state of states. Perhaps
what they want most of all is to have a say in the matter. An anal-
ogy might help here. Imagine a state policy to the effect that when
one spouse has been criminally abusive of the other and the victim
wants to have the marriage dissolved, the state imposes a new mar-
riage on the abused spouse, but this time to someone who is believed
to observe principles of justice. It is clear that this kind of procedure
would fail to treat the abused spouse as a person capable of autonomy
and would be wrong for that reason. An analogous problem would
occur if an otherwise justly ordered state of states coerced despotic
states into its organization against their will, thereby failing to treat
the peoples14 involved as capable of political autonomy. There is good
reason, then, given Kant's assumptions, to advocate not the coercive
formation of a state of states but a league instead and to hope that
the federation will subsequently become established voluntarily.
Kant's fear of despotism at the global level is also expressed in his
opposition to the so-called "universal monarchy," which emerges
when all states "fuse together" 18:367) by being absorbed into a sin-
gle hegemonic superpower. This form of world goverment, based on
one state's ability to overpower all other states, leads to "soulless
despotism" (8:367).
Kant's opposition to a universal monarchy, however, is not
inspired by a general opposition against states giving up their
sovereignty.15 States are allowed to join a federation when this hap-
pens voluntarily and with the preservation of the lawful freedom of
their citizens. In fact, Kant believes that reason requires them to do
so (8:357) and that there consequently is a moral duty to promote
the establishment of a federative state of states (but via the estab-
lishment of a league).
Read in this way, there is no tension between Kant's advocacy
of the league of states and the many other, oft-overlooked pas-
sages in Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals in which
Kant expresses the ideal of a state-like federation. For example, he
expresses the hope that "distant parts of the world can peaceably
enter into relations with each other, relations which can ultimately
become publicly lawful and so bring humanity finally ever closer to a
cosmopolitan constitution" [Perpetual Peace, 8:3 58). He writes that
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justice requires "an internal constitution of the state in accordance
with pure principles of right, and then further, however, the union
of this state with other neighboring or also distant states for the
purpose of a lawful settlement of their conflicts" [Perpetual Peace,
8:379). And he writes in the Metaphysics of Morals that before states
leave the state of nature all international right is merely "provi-
sional," and that international right can come to hold definitively
and establish a true perpetual peace only "in a universal union of
states \Staatenverein] (analogous to that by which a people becomes
a state)," a union that Kant on the same page refers to also as a "state
of peoples" [Völkerstaat] (Morals, 6:350).
Thus, Kant endorsed the idea of a federative "state of states"
throughout the 17805 and 17908, but during the 17905 he began advo-
cating the establishment of a league of states as the means to promote
this ultimate ideal. It is possible that Kant made this change while
observing France's behavior: Here was a republic that coercively
incorporated unwilling states into its republican (and according to
Kant as such correct) framework. Even though France dethroned
their "tyrants," the populations of the conquered states turned out
to be quite resistant to their self-proclaimed liberators. There were
also cases, however, in which the French were (initially) welcomed,
as with the Dutch Republic in early 1795. It is possible that Kant
had these latter cases in mind when he voiced the hope that when a
"powerful and enlightened people" can transform itself into a repub-
lic (a reference to France), this provides a core for other states to join
and form a federative union (Perpetual Peace, 8:356).
"Cosmopolitan right" is the third category of public right, pre-
sented as such for the first time in Perpetual Peace and also included
in the Metaphysics of Morals. Its discussion takes up just a few pages
and it was hardly mentioned at all in the Kant literature until fairly
recently, but it now enjoys considerable attention. Cosmopolitan
right regulates the interactions between states and foreigners, for
example, regarding migration, commercial ties, or attempts at colo-
nial settlements.
In cosmopolitan right, "individuals and states who stand in an
external relationship of mutual influence are regarded as citizens of a
universal state of humankind [allgemeinei Menschenstaat] [ius cos-
mopoliticum}" (Perpetual Peace, 8:349, note). At its core is the right
to hospitality. Despite the term, this right should not be understood
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as the right to be a guest. It is not even the right to enter foreign
territory,- rather, it is merely the right to attempt to be granted entry
or establish relations with others elsewhere, the right to present one-
self and make a request. Such a request may be denied, but not with
violence, and not if this leads to the death of the individuals involved
(8:358). Cosmopolitan right thus requires, for example, that states
provide a safe haven for refugees in peril and that they and their
inhabitants not intrude into or settle upon the territory of others
without their explicit agreement. Kant strongly criticizes the colo-
nial and international trading practices of his era, as the European
powers in their attitudes towards non-Europeans made no distinc-
tion between visiting and conquering other territories and "held
the inhabitants for nothing" (8:358). With this theory, Kant grants
humans anywhere on earth certain basic rights. In contrast to Lock-
ean theories, for example, Kant's theory grants nomads a rightful
claim to land.
Kant writes that cosmopolitan right is grounded in the "common
possession of the surface of the earth" {Perpetual Peace, 8:35 8) or the
"original community of the surface of the earth" (Morals, 6:352), but
he leaves much unclear as to the precise foundation and justifica-
tion of cosmopolitan right. One possible articulation of what might
be implicit here is the following: Originally, the earth was held in
common, and the acquisition of particular parts of it by particular
persons happened only at a later point in time. This implies that all
parts of the earth have to be regarded as in principle acquirable by
others, even if they currently have owners. To be able to try to acquire
a piece of land, however, one needs to be able to get in touch with its
owner. Hence, the in-principle acquirability of land implies a right
to present oneself to others elsewhere. This is at least how Kant's
argument was explicated by some of his followers at the time.16
If the argument is construed in this way, however, it provides at
best a partial grounding for cosmopolitan right because it does not
cover all the cases that Kant mentions as examples. It does cover
attempts at certain commercial transactions, but not, say, the case
of shipwrecked sailors (mentioned by Kant in the Vorarbeiten to
Perpetual Peace, 23:173). After all, they are not attempting to acquire
the beach where they wash ashore, but just to use it temporarily to
save their lives. If cosmopolitan right is grounded in a theory about
the origin of property rights, it does not address the question as to
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why and how cosmopolitan right would, in such cases, override the
established property rights of the owners to determine the use of
their land. Of course, the owner of the land would have a moral duty
to help the hapless sailors, but when the question is what grounds
the cosmopolitan right of the latter, Kant needs a different argument.
Kant could probably have developed such an argument from the
"innate right to freedom" of which he speaks in the Metaphysics
of Morals (6:237-8). This right includes the "right to be there where
nature or chance (without (one's) will| has placed (one]" (6:262]. Else-
where, Kant motivates this by saying that being on land is necessary
for the very existence of human beings, and thus, that people have a
right to be on the land on which they are placed through no choice
of their own, since denying them this right would mean denying
them their existence and their freedom (23:318). As it stands, how-
ever, Kant does not use this argumentative strategy in his published
discussion of cosmopolitan right.
III. THE PROCESS TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE
Kant claims that the achievements in the three areas of public right
hang together such that peace is attainable only if all three positive
conditions have been satisfied [Perpetual Peace, 8:349, note; Morals,
6:311). He does not stipulate a temporal sequence among them (as if
the league of states were possible only after all states have become
republics, and cosmopolitan right were possible only thereafter).
This raises questions as to how Kant envisions the practical real-
ization of what is normatively required according to his legal theory.
He regularly criticizes thinkers who ground their normative theo-
ries on empirical considerations of what is feasible, but this should
not lead one to think that he finds unimportant the empirical ques-
tion of whether and how the normative ideals can be achieved. It
is a question that can be posed correctly, however, only after the
normative ideals have been formulated. Kant does find it impor-
tant to show that although his ideals are grounded in pure reason,
they are not unrealistic. In order to show this, he provides a teleo-
logical account of history that revolves around the assumption that
nature is organized ideologically in such a way as to support the
cause of law-governed peace and moral development.17 "Nature"
here includes both human and nonhuman nature - the teleological
Kant's theory of peace 491
account encompasses everything from arrangements that enable
humans to physically spread across the globe (driftwood that pro-
vides wood in icy regions, camels that can transport humans through
the Sahara, etc.) to human psychological propensities, especially the
"unsocial sociability" that drives humans to develop their rational
potential.
As early as the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that teleolog-
ical judgments can be justified as heuristic principles (A 687/8 715),
and in the "Ideas toward a Universal History" he provides a teleolog-
ical account of history on this basis. He proposes to regard history
as progressing towards the "full development of all human predis-
positions" {Universal History, 8:27). A crucial part of this process
is the development of a perfect internal state constitution as well
as the establishment of an international federation of states. With
these conditions in place, there will be room for moral education,
culminating in the self-transformation of humanity into a "moral
whole" (8:21). In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant fur-
ther develops his account of the epistemological status of ideological
judgments and argues that all of nature can be regarded as teleolog-
ically oriented towards human "culture" (in its eighteenth-century
meaning of "development"). This culture is itself subservient to the
"final end of creation," which Kant determines as humans as moral
beings (5:435-6). Finally, in the third Critique, too, we find the claim
that legal progress will promote moral progress towards peace: Kant
defends the assumption (not knowledge claim] that nature is orga-
nized in such a way that it "prepares (if not establishes] lawfulness
combined with the freedom of states and thereby the unity of a
morally grounded system of states" (5:433).
Of course this teleological account of history, developed in the
"Ideas toward a Universal History" for the sake of presenting history
as an orderly whole, can be put to use also in the service of moral the-
ory. The assumption of progress is encouraging for the moral agent
because it presents the normative ideals as not unrealistic. This does
not of course mean that the moral subject can therefore become inac-
tive and let nature do all the work. Duty remains duty even if natural
forces lend a hand. What is more, nature cannot do all of the work.
The full attainment of the final end requires morality itself, and
morality can be the product only of genuinely free agency. Nature
can, according to Kant, produce certain kinds of behavior in people,
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and insofar as right concerns the behavior of people (not their motiva-
tion), nature can bring about that which right requires and thus lead
all the way to peace as defined in terms of right. For peace to be truly
perpetual, however, it needs to be supported by moral dispositions
(and this is of course also what morality requires). The fragile "nat-
ural" peace is itself conducive to its gradual and never-ending trans-
formation into a perpetual "moral" peace, and this is how nature
paves the way for morality without eliminating freedom, duty, and
virtue.
With regard to the goal of peace specifically, Kant argues that self-
interest drives humans in the direction of peace. Modern warfare
is becoming so costly that states will find it prudent to strive for
peace; and despotic states that fail to realize this and keep waging
war will exhaust themselves. During the 17905 Kant begins to stress
that when this happens, it opens up room for republicanization. Kant
saw France as a good example of how despotic states are their own
worst enemy. On his interpretation, Louis XVI, having exhausted all
financial resources, had been forced to turn to the people and cede
power in the process, thereby giving the people room to transform
the state into a republic. Kant adds the view also that republics,
because citizens decide whether there will be war or not, are by
nature more peaceful. It is easy for despots to declare war because
they hardly bear the consequences personally, shifting the actual
dangers and burdens to their subjects. In a republic, by contrast, cit-
izens will realize that war means higher taxes, personal risks, loss
of liberties, and so on, and that this goes against their own interests.
Either way, it is in every state's interest to avoid war, and hence it is
in their interest to join a league that promotes peace.
Exactly how the league of states is supposed to promote further
progress toward peace from there on is not particularly clear. Kant
conceives of the league on the model of a congress of states, where
delegates from the member states can bring complaints and submit
conflicts to mediation and arbitration [Morals, 6:350). The league
could, of course, encompass more than just a focus on conflict res-
olution, by, say, supporting other kinds of international programs
that are conducive to mutual understanding and peace, such as edu-
cational programs, cultural cooperation, or mutual aid. Kant himself
does not specify any of this, although these proposals would be com-
patible with his other views.
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With regard to the mechanisms that further the realization of cos-
mopolitan right, Kant mentions the "spirit of trade." He maintains
that this is essentially a force for peace because trade encourages peo-
ple across the globe to entertain friendly relations with each other for
the sake of mutually beneficial commercial interactions (Perpetual
Peace, 8:368).
The peace that is established on the basis of self-interest is frag-
ile, of course, and Kant is the first to admit this (8:357),18 but he
expects the legal peace (external freedom) to have a positive effect for
morality (inner freedom). Even a peace based on sheer self-interest,
he believes, makes it possible to expand human rights and interests
and to divert resources to education and enlightenment instead of
armament. In Kant's eyes this becomes a self-reinforcing process.
When states improve internally as a consequence of peace, they pro-
vide even better environments for further political and even moral
development. As a result, Kant believes, people gradually come to see
the Tightness of what they initially consented to only on the basis of
self-interest. They will then come to accept peace as not merely pru-
dent but right, and this will make the peace more and more stable.
He expects that as a result of cultural development within states,
people will gradually converge on moral and juridical-political prin-
ciples, and that this will eventually yield an agreement to a peace
that is durable {8:367; see also the earlier references to similar state-
ments in Universal History and Judgment).
The most salient passage is probably the one found in the Voiai-
beiten to the Metaphysics of Morals. Here Kant writes that when
laws secure freedom externally, inner freedom (morality) will "come
alive" and this, in turn, will enhance obedience to the laws. This
self-reinforcing process gradually makes the legal peace ever more
secure because peace becomes less a matter of mere self-interest and
more a matter of moral disposition:
A firmly established peace, combined with the greater interaction among
people \Menschen] is the idea through which alone is made possible the
transition from the duties of right to the duties of virtue. Since when the
laws secure freedom externally, the maxims to also govern oneself internally
in accordance with laws can come alive,- and conversely, the latter in turn
make it easier, through their dispositions for lawful coercion to have an
influence, so that peaceful conduct [friedliches Verhaken] under public laws
and pacific dispositions [friedfeitige Gesinnungen] (to also end the inner war
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between principles and inclinations), i.e., legality and morality find in the
concept of peace the point of support for the transition from the Doctrine of
Right to the Doctrine of Virtue.
(23:353~4, Vorarbeiten to the Metaphysics of Morals]
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant emphasizes that this process will
never completely reach its goal. He assumes that when the state of
states becomes very large, it will no longer be able successfully to
protect all of its members against other states. This problem can-
not be solved by allowing multiple (smaller) states of states to keep
the peace because these would themselves still exist in the state of
nature. The political principle to strive for and approximate a state
of states is not unfeasible, however, and therefore it remains a duty
to continually approximate the idea of a single state of states.
IV. RECEPTION AND RESPONSE
Kant's first positive requirement for peace, namely, that every state
be a republic (in Kant's sense of the term] because republics are
naturally more peaceful, has provoked much discussion. It has led
some theorists to assume that international peace, in the ideal at
least, does not require any international institution with coercive
powers to enforce international right. After all, if all states are
republics (or, in current usage, democracies), and these do not wage
war against each other, then international peace can be achieved via
democratization. '9
In its generality Kant's thesis has proven to be too strong, how-
ever. Democracies turn out not to be any less war-prone toward
nondemocracies than nondemocracies are toward each other.10 One
explanation of why democracies wage war despite the fact that
the citizens, who shoulder the burdens, have a say in the decision
whether to go to war, may have to do with the role of power and the
possibility of using ideology and manipulation to mobilize a civilian
population to rally behind a war. Kant did not sufficiently take these
factors into account. If the disinclination toward war, on the part of
democracies, is merely an effect of their calculation of risks and ben-
efits, then differences in power among the various states may lead to
different results than Kant thought. The citizens of a very powerful
state may well come to the conclusion that a successful war against a
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weaker state will serve their own long-term interests. Such citizens
may feel comfortable undertaking war if they believe they are the
strongest and they assess the risks as outweighed by the expected
gains. Also, even in a representative democracy the decision to wage
war is not necessarily made by those who shoulder the heaviest bur-
dens (e.g., the representatives may not generally be from the same
social class as those who risk their lives). Furthermore, citizens can
be convinced by effective rhetoric or distorted information: Power-
ful interests may persuade them that war is a necessity to prevent a
greater disaster in the future, that war will bring honor or take away
shame, or that war is required to serve justice or God. Finally, per-
haps part of the explanation of why democracies wage war is also
that democracies more easily regard nondemocracies as a threat or
an outrage.
When limited to the narrower thesis that democracies do not start
wars against other democracies, however, the empirical evidence
seems quite strong. As Michael Doyle has argued on the basis of
a study of two centuries worth of wars, it does appear that democra-
cies have started wars only against non-democracies.21 Of course, one
could wonder whether counterexamples to the thesis of the peace-
fulness of democracies towards each other could be found in acts
of violence like, say, the 1973 assassination of Salvador Allende in
Chile. Still, there is at least a striking pattern. Moreover, Kant's claim
is not that republics will never wage war, but that they are signif-
icantly less likely to do so (not because they generally tend to act
more in accordance with moral requirements, but because the citi-
zens need to be convinced that war is necessary and they will have to
shoulder the burdens of the war). And when narrowed to the behav-
ior of democracies toward each other, this claim seems to have the
statistics on its side.
One side effect of narrowing Kant's thesis in this way, however,
is that it invalidates his general confidence in the pacific role of
republics in the greater process of achieving worldwide peace. If
democracies are no longer regarded as more pacific in general, just
more peaceful toward fellow democracies, then it is no longer clear
how the enlightened self-interest of the citizens of democracies helps
to promote world peace, even if it helps reduce warfare among democ-
racies themselves. After all, the narrowed thesis is compatible with
the existing democracies jointly subjugating or exploiting the rest
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of the world. It might then still be true that a world of democracies
would be peaceful, or in any event more peaceful, than the present
world. But it would no longer be clear that democracies naturally
play a crucial role in the process of bringing worldwide peace closer.
It is an indication of the importance of Kant's theory of interna-
tional right, especially his advocacy for a league of states, that it
has been the subject of intense debate for more than two centuries.
"Realists" strongly reject it because they regard the normative prin-
ciples expounded by Kant as inapplicable to the international arena.
Kant's views have also found many supporters, however, and when
states in the twentieth century moved to form first the League of
States and then the United Nations, his defense of a league of states
was often invoked - even if the resulting bodies only partially cor-
responded to the league proposed by Kant (most notably perhaps,
standing armies were not abolished). Among recent political theo-
rists, John Rawls is one who defends a voluntary league via an explicit
appeal to Kant. Rawls often claims that he is "following Kant's
lead" in his defense of a confederation of free and independent states
( "peoples, " in his terminology) and in his opposition against any form
of world government.12
Kant's theory of international right has also, however, faced sev-
eral criticisms from very early on. One point of contention has been
whether Kant allows the league too much or too little coercive power
to enforce its laws. From Johann Gottlieb Fichte to Jürgen Habermas,
critics have asserted that Kant wrongly fails to extend coercive mil-
itary powers to the league of states. Romantics, by contrast, starting
with the young Friedrich Schlegel, have criticized Kant for including
any power to coerce in his ideal of the good state.
According to the first tradition of critics, Kant is inconsistent in
advocating the establishment of a voluntary league rather than a
stronger form of federation of states. As explained above, the per-
ception is that he reduces the normative requirement of a strong
federation to the weaker requirement of a league, on the basis of
the assessment that states are unlikely to want to join a federation
that has the authority to coerce member states into compliance with
its laws. This is just the kind of realist-empiricist move that Kant
himself regularly denounces.
One reaction among Kantian theorists has been to try to rectify
the perceived inconsistency by using Kant's own arguments against
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Kant to advocate the establishment of an international federation
with the authority and means to enforce its laws. Already in his
Grundlage des Naturrechts of 1796, Fichte insists that the federation
of states should have the power to enforce member compliance coer-
cively because this is the only way to end war and provide a way to
adjudicate conflicts in accordance with just laws. Member states in
the federation ought to recognize each other through treaties, regard
each other as equals, and treat each other's citizens rightfully. If a
member state violates these rules, however, it is the task of the fed-
eration to punish this state.1' In recent Kantian political theory one
can similarly find appeals to strengthen the military powers of the
United Nations, for example, in the work of fürgen Habermas and
Otfried Höffe.24 If one reads Kant's texts according to the interpre-
tation outlined earlier, however, there is actually no inconsistency
to be corrected and the "amendment" appears in a different light.
Given the standard reading, however, Kant has of course influenced
the debate as one who advocates a voluntary league and opposes a
stronger federation of states.
To more romantic readers, such as Friedrich Schlegel in his 1796
review of Perpetual Peace, the problem with Kant's theory is rather
an empirically tainted and unduly pessimistic model of the state
that carries over into his theory of international relations. Schlegel
claimed that a truly pure concept of the state should not depend
on the assertion that people will act against the law, and hence
that the ideal of the state should not include "political power and
dependence," for these are introduced into the concept of the state
only on the assumption that people violate the law. "Therefore,"
says Schegel, "not every state includes the relationship between a
superior and a subordinate, but only the state that is empirically
determined by that actual fact." The ideal state, by contrast, is non-
hierarchical and noncoercive. By extension, the same is true at the
international level: The ideal should be a noncoercive, nonhierarchi-
cal republic of republics, characterized by the freedom and equality
of the individual member states, who freely obey common laws.is
Interestingly, and perhaps even in response to Schlegel, Kant
points out in the Metaphysics of Morals that it is "not experience"
and "not a fact" that necessitates the coercive powers of the state, but
rather the mere possibility that people violate each other's spheres
of freedom. On Kant's own view this possibility is implicit in the
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very concept of the state of nature (Morals, 6:312 ). By extension, the
same argument could be used with regard to the coercive powers of
the federation of states.
A further standard criticism of Kant's theory in Perpetual Peace,
likewise voiced already by early critics, such as Friedrich Gentz, is
that the league of states would be unable to bring about peace. The
charge is that if the league is merely voluntary and devoid of the
authority to enforce compliance, states will join only if and as long
as they are interested in peace. As soon as their perception of their
interests changes, they will simply walk away from their "commit-
ment" to peace, which therefore is no real commitment. Hence, the
league makes no practical difference at all."
While it is certainly true that Kant says surprisingly little about
how he envisions the league to work, he does not actually claim that
the league will by itself bring about durable peace (see, e.g., Perpetual
Peace, 8:357], but rather that it is an important step on the way to a
perpetual peace. If this is granted, the burden of proof can be shifted to
the side of the critics, as they would now need to show that opening
up channels of communication and negotiation does not help at all
to further the cause of peace.
Finally, with regard to Kant's claim that peace at the legal level will
have beneficial effects that will reinforce the stability of this peace
over time, few if any current Kantians share all of Kant's views regard-
ing the moral development of humankind. Yet significant aspects of
Kant's view that legal peace is conducive to moral learning can still
be found in the work of Kantian theorists. For instance, Rawls main-
tains that the more the "law of peoples," as specified in his own work,
is observed, the more moral learning will take place. By the latter he
means a psychological process by which peoples will tend to accept
the law of peoples as an ideal of conduct. He expects this process
to transform what once was a mere modus vivendi into something
much more stable. Thus, Rawls too works with the assumption that
a peace that is initially agreed to on the basis of self-interest can
itself be conducive to a process that leads to its further stabilization,
namely, the development of dispositions on the basis of which the
peace is regarded as right, not just prudent.17
As for Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right, perhaps the most strik-
ing fact about its reception is the lack of it. Fichte gave cosmopolitan
right a place in his Grundlage des Naturrechts, published between
Kant's theory of peace 499
Kant's Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals. He trans-
formed it into the most basic human right - the right to have and
acquire rights. Anyone, stranger or not, has "the right to have all
human beings presuppose that they can enter into a legal relation-
ship with him through treaties."2S Cosmopolitan right includes the
conditions for the possibility of requesting entrance into a legal rela-
tionship with others anywhere on earth.1' During the first decades of
the nineteenth century, too, there were some Kantians who formu-
lated their own versions of cosmopolitan right.30 After that, interest
waned, however, and in the reception of Kant's theory of peace cos-
mopolitan right generally stood in the shadow of his advocacy of the
league of states.
Strikingly enough, however, developments in twentieth-century
international law have gone quite far in the direction of implement-
ing the requirements of Kant's cosmopolitan right. In particular, the
status of individuals under international law has been expanded in an
unprecedented way. International law now grants individuals certain
rights as humans (i.e., rights that are not tied to a particular nation-
ality). Examples of these are the refugee rights that were codified in
the twentieth century.31
Moreover, Kant's introduction of cosmopolitan right into his the-
ory of right shows that he realized that world peace requires not
merely peace between states, but also peaceful behavior of states
and foreign individuals towards each other. In this context, Kant
himself referred, on the one hand, to the imperialism and colonial-
ism of European states toward people who had not formed states
yet, and, on the other hand, to what he regarded as the rightful pro-
hibition by some foreign states against European trading companies
entering their territories. In our own time, the international terrorist
attacks by groups who are not acting as representatives of states but
who direct their attacks against states and their citizens painfully
underscore the truth of Kant's claim that world peace, that is, the
security of the external freedom of all persons, requires more than
peace among states.
Kant's confidence in the pacific nature of the "spirit of trade"
(which he believes to show that cosmopolitan right can be real-
ized) has proven to be too optimistic. Despite his claim that interna-
tional commerce "cannot coexist with war" [Perpetual Peace, 8:368),
the term "trade war" is not an oxymoron. Although commercial
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interests run counter to war sometimes, they do not always do so.
Kant failed to take account of the struggles that develop in the com-
petition over access to and control over markets or raw materials. As
long as there are individual states, their interests can be expected to
clash on occasion, and as a result states will be motivated to use the
means at their disposal to get their way (when the issue is merely one
of self-interested calculations). Second, the international arms trade
has developed into a sizeable economic force (also in democracies,
which house some of the world's largest arms producers]. The produc-
tion and sale of weapons are directly or indirectly a source of income
and influence for a state, as well as employment for its citizens,
which means that states have strong incentives to keep this going,
but of course this supports exactly the kind of arms races that Kant
regarded as so pernicious. This is not the same as saying that trade is
necessarily a force for the worse. There are of course cases in which
commercial interests avert a war or in which greed prompts a dic-
tator to enact liberal reforms in order to attract foreign investment.
Nevertheless, the relationship between international trade and peace
is more complicated than Kant assumed.
The fact that Kant's views regarding the forces that promote peace
are subject to considerable critique, however, does not mean that
peace should be regarded as "unrealistic" and that the state of nature
among states should simply be accepted. For one thing, none of what
has been said earlier rules out that the ideal of peace can be approx-
imated. From the Kantian point of view, this possibility in princi-
ple is all that is required to keep the striving for peace from turning
into an empty irrational gesture. Thus, contemporary theorists in the
Kantian tradition may be even less confident than Kant himself (who,
in the Metaphysics of Morals, called perpetual peace an idea that
could not be realized completely), but this need not affect their view
that it can and ought to be a political principle to strive for peace.
The interactions between states, as well as the interactions between
states and foreign individuals, ought to conform to principles of jus-
tice and hence should be subject to proper regulation. The feasibility
of increased transnational regulation is also underscored by the fact
that it has in fact already increased enormously over the past cen-
tury or so - think of the United Nations, the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the International Criminal Court, and many other international
organizations. What is more, rather than making Kant's theory of
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peace obsolete, the very difficulties that stand in the way of the real-
ization of peace underscore the importance of proper international
regulation. For those who do not just want to say that in the inter-
national arena might makes right, Kant's theory of peace represents
a classic theoretical framework for developing a set of normative
ideals concerning international relations and the human rights of
individuals.
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